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A New Look at an Old Conundrum: The
Determinative Test for the Hybrid Sales/
Service Transaction Under Section
402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts
by Charles E. Cantu*
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the concept of strict tort liability was con-
fined to two areas: injuries resulting from dangerous activi-
ties' and harm inflicted by wild and/or dangerous animals.2
But, in 1963, the California Supreme Court held in Greenman
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; B.A., University of
Texas; J.D., St. Mary's University; M.C.L., Southern Methodist University; LL.M.,
University of Michigan, Fulbright Scholar. The author wishes to express profound
gratitude to his colleague, John W. Teeter, Jr., for his advice and help, and to his re-
search assistants, Leslie A. .Coleman and especially Diana L. Roberts, without whose
enthusiasm, dedication and hard work this article could not have been written.
1. Strict liability for dangerous activities developed from an 1868 English case in
which water stored in a reservoir flooded the plaintiff's coal mines. See Rylands v.
Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). The court held that:
It]he person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage
which is the natural consequence of its escape.
Id. at 339-40.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1965), encompasses the law of
strict liability for dangerous activities essentially as it was put forth in Rylands. See,
e.g., Enos Coal Mining Co. v. Schuchart, 188 N.E.2d 406, 410 (Ind. 1963) (vibrations
caused by explosives in coal mining); Healey v. Citizens' Gas & Elec. Co., 201 N.W.
118, 119 (Iowa 1924) (overflow and percolation of water); Berg v. Reaction Motors
Div., 181 A.2d 487, 489 (N.J. 1962) (testing rocket engine for supersonic airplane);
Thigpen v. Skousen & Hise, 327 P.2d 802, 803 (N.M. 1958) (blasting operations); Loe v.
Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 314 (Or. 1961) (aerial application of chemicals).
2. It is well accepted that "one who harbors a wild animal, which by its very
nature is vicious and unpredictable, does so at his peril, and liability for injuries inflicted
by such animal is absolute." Collins v. Otto, 369 P.2d 564, 566 (Colo. 1962) (en banc)
(coyote bite). See, e.g., Opelt v. Al G. Barnes Co., 183 P. 241, 241 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1919) (vicious acts of leopard); Copley v. Wills, 152 S.W. 830, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913) (injury from monkey). See generally Mary Coate McNeely, A Footnote on Dan-
gerous Animals, 37 MicH. L. REV. 1181 (1939) (contrasting causes of action based on
location of animals).
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v. Yuba Power Products3 that the theory of strict liability in
tort also included products. In 1965, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts adopted Section 402A and endorsed the theory
of Greenman that strict liability was available as a distinct
cause of action in litigation involving injuries caused by defec-
tive products. The consequences of this innovative theory
were not only an explosion in the number of resulting law
suits,5 but also some initial confusion.6 The courts were not
sure how to apply some of the novel provisions of Section
402A. Much of the indecision has now settled,7 and Section
402A continues to be a source of compensation for injured
plaintiffs.8 There are, however, a few questions that require
3. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
4. Products liability originated in contract law requiring privity between the in-
jured party and the defendant. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842). Eventually, the buyer's possible causes of action expanded to include the con-
cepts of warranty and negligence. See generally Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability
in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REv. 119 (1958) (describing the emergence of strict liability
regarding products). Strict liability may attach to:
conduct which does not so far depart from social standards as to fall within
the traditional boundaries of negligence-usually because the advantages
which it offers to the defendant and to the community outweigh even the ab-
normal risk; but which is still so far socially unreasonable that the defendant is
not allowed to carry it on without making good any actual harm which it does
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 537
(5th ed. 1984).
5. See generally Michael Hoenig, Products Liability Problems and Proposed Re-
forms, 1977 INS. L.J. 213, 220 ("The modern era of products liability has witnessed a
tremendous growth of claims involving a wide diversity of products and factual circum-
stances."). See also John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973) (recognizing that strict liability for injury has "swept" the area
of products liability).
6. "The law of product liability has become filled with uncertainties ...." IN-
TERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, BRIEFING REPORT, at iii (January
1, 1977).
7. See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ill. 1965) (holding
strict liability applicable absent privity or negligence), aff'g 201 N.E.2d 313 (11. App.
Ct. 1964); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849-51 (Tex. 1979) (defin-
ing "defect" and "unreasonably dangerous" in design defect cases), rev'g 567 S.W.2d
812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 870
(Tex. 1978) (recognizing strict liability involves determination of whether product is
defective).
8. See, e.g., State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966)
(concluding § 402A states appropriate standards of responsibility for manufacturer),
cert. denied sub nom. Yates v. Hodges, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon,
398 S.W.2d 240, 248-49 (Tenn. 1966) (expressing approval of and quoting § 402A);
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explanation or refinement.
One issue of particular concern involves the sales/service
transaction. 9 Initially, it was clear that the scope of Section
402A 10 involved the sale" of products 2 that were in a defec-
tive condition 3 when they entered the stream of commerce.
14
Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. 1967) (adopting
§ 402A as expression of strict tort liability).
9. See, e.g., Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 59 P.2d 144, 145 (Cal. 1936) (holding
restaurant food service amounts to sale and imposes an implied warranty to serve food
fit for human consumption), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Mexicali Rose v. Su-
perior Court, 822 P.2d 1292 (Cal. 1992) (en banc); Worrell v. Barnes, 484 P.2d 573, 576
(Nev. 1971) (finding breach of implied warranty and sale under the U.C.C. when con-
tractor supplied defective gas fitting); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792,
794 (N.Y. 1954) (distinguishing blood transfusion as service and not sale). In Perlmut-
ter, the court explained why the case did not involve a breach of warranty under the
Sales Act: "it has long been recognized that, when service predominates, and transfer of
personal property is but an incidental feature of the transaction, the transaction is not
deemed a sale within the Sales Act." Id. See also Steve Brook, Comment, Sales-Service
Hybrid Transactionr A Policy Approach, 28 S.W. L.J. 575 (1974). The author explains
that:
A limitation has been placed on the doctrine in an attempt by the courts
to distinguish between sales and service transactions, limiting the doctrine to
the pure sales transactions involving tangible products, normally chattels. If
the "product" carrying the potential risks from defects was a service, for ex-
ample, the repair of equipment or the application of hair dye in a beauty shop,
the plaintiff has been forced to prove a failure by this "seller" to use reason-
able care. More recently, a plaintiff has been allowed to rely on liability with-
out fault in transactions involving tangible products--transfers such as the
bailment or rental of automobiles-which could be termed "quasi-sales" or
transfers less than a sale.
Id. at 575 (footnotes omitted).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
11. See id. cmt. c (justifying rule emerged from the idea that sellers recognize a
responsibility to public to sell safe products); see also S.R. Shapiro, Annotation, Prod-
ucts Liability: Strict Liability in Tort, 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967), where it is specified
that in a strict products liability case the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
was involved by manufacturing, selling, or otherwise placing the product into the
stream of commerce. Id at 1077.
12. See, e.g., Flippo v. Mode O'Day Frock Shops of Hollywood, 248 Ark. 1, 5,449
S.W.2d 692, 694 (1970) (rejecting strict liability under § 402A where no product was
defective); Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 528 P.2d 76, 77 (Or. 1974) (refusing to
extend scope of § 402A to include defective installation of nondefective product).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965), describes a prod-
uct as defective if it leaves the seller's hands "in a condition not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer" and is "unreasonably dangerous to him." See Roger J. Traynor,
The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV.
363, 373 (1965), in which Traynor claims there is no definitive meaning assigned to
"defective." See also David A. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39
Mo. L. REv. 339, 341-342 (1974) (explaining the meaning of defect under the
Restatement).
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It was never intended that the ramifications of Section 402A
would apply to service transactions.15 While one jurisdiction
strayed from this original position,'6 the courts have consist-
ently refused to extend the idea of strict liability to service
agreements.' 7 Evidently, the prevailing thought has been that
when a service is performed, the most a consumer can expect
14. See Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts: A Mirror Crack'd, 25 GONZ. L. REv. 205, 212-14 (1990). The author traces
the changing meaning of "sells" as it applies to § 402A. Initially, this section was con-
cerned only with pure sales transactions. Id. at 212. Gradually, though, the scope of
claims under § 402A grew to include lease agreements, free products, and complemen-
tary gifts. Id. at 212-14. See, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 727 (Cal. 1970)
(holding strict liability in tort applicable to lessors and bailors); Ettin v. Ava Truck
Leasing, Inc., 251 A.2d 278, 285 (N.J. 1969) (allowing strict liability in tort for defective
leased truck), aff'g 242 A.2d 663 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968); McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1967) (holding defendant strictly liable for
injuries caused by free sample of permanent hair wave solution), rev'g 408 S.W.2d 124
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
15. From its inception, § 402A was not regarded as an avenue for holding service
providers strictly liable in tort. James B. Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Cita-
del Under Assault, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 13, 13 (1978). See, e.g., Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.
v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833, 839 (Alaska 1967) (recognizing strict liabil-
ity not imposed on those furnishing labor or service); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342,
.346 (Tex. 1968) (refusing to apply strict liability for prescription and fitting of contact
lenses), aff'g Texas State Optical v. Barbee, 417 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967);
Easterly v. Hospital of Texas, 772 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
epidural kit sold by hospital was so closely tied to professional services it lost its distinct
character as a good). See generally E.C. Cowley, Jr., Annotation, Application of Rule of
Strict Liability in Tort to Person Rendering Services, 29 A.L.R.3d 1425 (1970).
16. New Jersey excepted from applying strict products liability only to products
and found no reason to limit it in such a way. See, e.g., Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258
A.2d 697, 702-05 (N.J. 1969) (holding strict liability applies to hybrid sales/service
transaction), aff'g 246 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1968); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 778-80 (N.J. 1965) (applying strict liability to rental of vehicle).
17. The basis for disallowing strict liability for injuries arising out of a service was
articulated in the landmark case of Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15 (Cal. 1954) (en banc).
The California Supreme Court recognized the established rule that "those who sell their
services for the guidance of others in their economic, financial, and personal affairs are
not liable in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct." Id. at 20. See, e.g.,
Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12, 16 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding hospital
that provided services not strictly liable); Lemley v. J & B Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378,
1379 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (refusing to extend § 402A to supplier of service); Stewart
Warner Corp. v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 343 F. Supp. 953, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (recogniz-
ing strict liability in tort does not cover services); Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, 539
P.2d 584, 587 (Idaho 1975) (acknowledging Restatement concerns only sale of products
and declining to expand it to personal services); Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584
A.2d 1383, 1386-87 (Pa. 1991) (finding § 402A inapplicable to dispensing of prescrip-
tion drugs), aff'g 538 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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is the conduct of a reasonable prudent person.'"
In cases where it has been unclear whether the bargain in
question involved either the sale of a product or the rendering
of a service, the courts have looked to the "predominant fac-
tor" test to determine whether strict liability as provided by
Section 402A applied.' 9 This issue requires a determination of
the true essence or thrust of the transaction.20 Alternatively;
when working within the confines of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which is also concerned with the sale of goods and not
the rendering of services, the same issue may be determined by
employing the "gravamen" test.2' These two standards, one
18. "The very essence of a transaction involving the service provider is the per-
formance of a particular service with reasonable care, competence, and skill. This coin-
cides with the reasonable expectations of the customer that the contracted for services
will be performed in a reasonably careful, skillful, and competent manner." Sales, supra
note 15, at 18. The author also noted that the service provider does not deal with
middlemen and, therefore, only the serviceman can be judged. Id. at 19. See, e.g.,
Roberts v. Karr, 3 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (holding professional to
standard of reasonable person); Milau Assoc. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 391 N.Y.S.2d
628, 629-30 (N.Y. App. Div.) (holding where services are concerned, proper method of
recovery exists in negligence), aff'd, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882 (N.Y. 1977); Young v. Bridwell,
437 P.2d 686, 690 (Utah 1968) (requiring counsel to possess ordinary skill and knowl-
edge but not requiring knowledge of all the law).
19. See, eg., Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 321 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1968) (holding tire dealer strictly liable for injuries resulting from sale and instal-
lation of tire); Magrine v. Krasnica, 227 A.2d 539, 543 (N.J. Hudson County Ct. 1967)
(finding dentist not strictly liable because he offers professional service), aff'd sub nom.
Magrine v. Spector, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aff'd, 250 A.2d 129
(N.J. 1969); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (N.Y. 1954) (estab-
lishing that when service predominates over product, strict liability is unavailable). See
generally 2 ROBERT D. HURSH & HENRY J. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 6.17, at 80 (2d ed. 1974) (discussing strict liability in tort for one who
performs services); David L. Phipps, When Does A "Service" Become A "Sale", 39 INS.
COUNS. J. 274, 278 (1972) (recognizing difficulty in applying § 402A to situations in-
volving both "sale" and "service").
20. See, e.g., Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir.
1981) (determining underlying nature of transaction was for service and repair of
truck); Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (applying "predominant
factor" test to determine if thrust of agreement was for sale or installation of bowling
equipment); Meeks v. Bell, 710 S.W.2d 789, 795 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (using "predomi-
nant purpose" or "essence of the transaction" test to evaluate whether installation of
heat pump is sale or service), rev'd on other grounds, 725 S.W.2d 179 (rex. 1987).
21. See 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-
102:04, at 12 (1984), in which the author suggests abandoning the "predominant factor"
test and instead focusing on whether the gravamen of the transaction involves products
or services. Specific reference is made to the decision in Worrell v. Barnes, 484 P.2d
573, 574 (Nev. 1971), which concerned escaping gas from a leaky fitting. 1 HAWK-
LAND, supra this note, at 12. The author supports the view that if the leak resulted
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employed in the area of torts and the other in the sphere of
contracts, involve the same question, but often produce differ-
ent results. The purpose of this article is to discuss the history
and application of both standards and argue for an adoption
of the gravamen test in cases arising under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.
II. THE SALES/SERVICE TRANSACTION
Before discussing the predominant factor and gravamen
tests, the sales/service transaction should be defined. In its
typical form, the hybrid transaction involves furnishing a
product while performing some service.22 Because the bargain
is not clearly delineated, some uncertainty arises as to the true
nature of the agreement.23 For example, when an optometrist
fits a patient for contact lenses 2 4 is payment made for the
lenses, or for the service of being tested and fitted? When an
individual purchases a residential hot water heater,25 does the
transaction involve the sale of the heater, or is the bargain for
the service of having it delivered and installed? In a medical
setting involving blood transfusions, 26 does the individual
from a defective product, a sale was at issue and the U.C.C. controlled. However, if the
leak was due to defective installation, the case involved a service and was outside the
scope of the U.C.C. 1 id.
22. See Nickel v. Hyster Co., 412 N.Y.S.2d 273 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). The court
states that "a hybrid service-sale transaction can give rise to a cause of action for breach
of warranty or strict products liability if the sales aspect of the transaction predominates
and the service aspect is merely incidental." Id at 276 (citations omitted). See gener-
ally 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 212 (1984) (describing hybrid transactions and
noting that viewing the action as involving both sale and service, with sale comprising
majority of the transaction, has lead to an application of strict liability).
23. Compare Epstein v. Giannattasio, 197 A.2d 342, 345 (Conn. C.P. 1963) (find-
ing beauty treatment was service and not sale) with Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc.,
481 P.2d 924, 926-27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (shampooing, applying permanent wave
solution, and styling hair constituted sale).
24. See Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968). The court in Barbee re-
fused to extend strict liability to the fitting and sale of contact lenses because the optom-
etry firm was considered to be in the business of providing a professional service, and
not a product. Id. at 345-46. See generally Cowley, supra note 15, at 1426; William C.
Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict Liability, 62 N.C. L.
REv. 415, 431 (1984).
25. See, e.g., Kopet v. Klein, 148 N.W.2d 385, 389-90 (Minn. 1967) (finding sale
where transfer of heater included installation); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d
314, 326 (N.J. 1965).(holding faulty installation of hot water system could result in
strict liability).
26. See generally Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death
1993] HYBRID SALES/SERVICE TRANSACTIONS 919
purchase a commodity in the form of blood, or the service of a
transfusion?27  Other examples of hybrid transactions could
include a payment for an air conditioning, 2s electrical, 29 heat-
ing,30  or plumbing system;31 concrete;32 steel;33 swimming
pools; 34 or floor coverings. 35 In each of these agreements, a
from Blood Transfusion, 45 A.L.R.3d 1364, 1389 (1972) (recognizing that courts differ
as to whether strict liability applies in blood transfusion cases); Irwin H. Haut & Aaron
A. Alter, Blood Transfusions-Strict Liability?, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 557, 562 (1969)
(recognizing service-sale dichotomy in blood transfusion cases); Gary L. Boland, Strict
Liability in Tort for Transfusing Contaminated Blood, 23 ARK. L. REV. 236, 236 (1969)
(analyzing whether blood transfusion constitutes service or sale).
27. Compare Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Colo. 1964)
(reasoning character of blood transfusion is service and not sale) and Whitehurst v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584, 586 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (furnishing of
blood was not sale) and Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 795-96 (N.Y.
1954) (concluding that blood transfusion constituted "service") with Cunningham v.
MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897, 899 (Ill. 1970) (holding blood was product
and sale occurred).
28. Compare Mingledorff's, Inc. v. Hicks, 209 S.E.2d 661, 662 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974) (installation of air conditioning system was service) with Howard Dodge & Sons,
Inc. v. Finn, 391 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (installation of air conditioning
system was sale).
29. Compare J & R Elec. Div. of J.O. Mory Stores v. Skoog Constr. Co., 348
N.E.2d 474, 477 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (finding subcontract for electrical work was not for
sale of goods) with Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 278 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1972) (supplying electricity was analogus to supplying product). See also Gary D.
Spivey, Annotation, Electricity, Gas, or Water Furnished by Public Utility as "Goods"
Within Provisions of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 on Sales, 48 A.L.R.3d 1060,
1061 (1973) (discussing whether electricity constitutes goods as applied to U.C.C.).
30. See Pineau v. White, 135 A.2d 716, 718 (N.H. 1957); Air Heaters v. Johnson
Elec., 258 N.W.2d 649, 653(N.D. 1977).
31. Compare United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. North Am. Steel Corp., 335
So. 2d 18, 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (furnishing, fabricating, and delivering piping
constituted sale) with Meyn v. Ross, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1357 (Pa. 1971)
(providing for material and installation of plumbing system was service). See generally
Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Applicability of UCC Article 2 to Mixed Contracts for
Sale of Goods and Services, 5 A.L.R.4th 501, 508-10 (1981).
32. See, e.g., Bevard v. Howat Concrete Co., 433 F.2d 1202, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(supplying concrete amounted to sale); Wilson v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 197 S.E.2d 686,
688 (S.C. 1973) (furnishing and delivering ready-mixed concrete constituted sale). But
see Freeman v. Shannon Constr., 560 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (finding
concrete transaction involved services).
33. Compare Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Debron Corp., 515 F. Supp. 803, 810
(D. Conn. 1980) (intending transfer of steel to predominate agreement and result in
sale), aff'd, 657 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1981) with Wehr Constr. v. Steel Fabricators, 769
S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding steel incorporated into construction
contract did not create sale).
34. Compare Riffe v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (installing
swimming pool amounted to sale) with Ben Constr. Corp. v. Ventre, 257 N.Y.S.2d 988,
989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (installing swimming pool amounted to service).
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product has been sold in conjunction with the rendering of a
service, and as a consequence, the true character of the bar-
gain becomes somewhat ambiguous. In light of the available
causes of action for an injured plaintiff, it becomes necessary
to determine the nature of the transaction. a6
As previously mentioned, the courts have accepted strict
liability as an available cause of action when a defective prod-
uct has caused an injury,37 except in cases in which services
were rendered.3 8 The generally accepted reasons for this posi-
tion are quite varied. First, individuals who provide services
usually do so on a one-on-one basis without the presence of a
35. Compare Robertson v. Ceola, 255 Ark. 703, 704, 501 S.W.2d 764, 766 (1973)
(finding agreement centered around installation of floor tile was for service) with Snyder
v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., 380 A.2d 618, 621 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (con-
cluding primary aspect of agreement to provide carpet was for sale).
36. A transaction may involve a pure sale, pure service, or sales/service hybrid
variation. See Dana Shelhimer, Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions and the
Strict Liability Dilemma, 43 Sw. L.J. 785, 787-89 (1989) (analyzing application of
§ 402A in terms of pure sale, pure service, and sales/service transactions). A pure sales
transaction occurs when the primary reason for entering into a transaction is for the
purchase of a product; therefore, strict liability applies. See Clary v. Fifth Ave.
Chrysler Ctr., 454 P.2d 244, 248 (Alaska 1969); Tuscon Indus. v. Schwartz, 501 P.2d
936, 940 (Ariz. 1972) (en banc); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 377 P.2d 897, 900
(Cal. 1963) (en banc); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
Generally, a plaintiff who is injured by a product will plead a claim not only for strict
products liability, but also for breach of warranty under the U.C.C. and negligence. 'See
WILLIAM KIMBLE & ROBERT 0. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 11, at 17 (1979).
Pure service transactions focus on the service provided rather than the incidental
products used while performing the service. See generally John C. Wunsch, The Defini-
tion of a Product for the Purposes of Section 402A, 50 INs. COUNS. J. 344, 354-57 (1983)
(differentiating services and products). All jurisdictions limit the applicability of
§ 402A to situations involving a product, see cases cited supra note 15. See also Winans
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 705 F.2d 1449, 1452-53 (5th Cir. 1983); Raritan Trucking
Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1972); Lemley v. J & B
Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378, 1379 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Sales, supra note 15, at 13. How-
ever, New Jersey is the sole exception, see supra note 16.
Sales/service hybrid transactions concern furnishing a product in conjunction with
performing a corresponding service related to that product. See Sales, supra note 15, at
13. Courts are inconsistent when applying strict liability to cases involving sales/service
hybrid transactions. Compare B & B Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Serv. v. Haifley,
25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 635, 637 (D.C. 1978) (installing air conditioning sys-
tem constituted sale of goods) with Mingledorff's, Inc. v. Hicks, 209 S.E.2d 661, 662
(Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (installing air conditioning system was service). See also supra
notes 23, 27-29, 31, 33-35.
37. See supra note 7.
38. See supra note 17.
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middle man.39 The service is tailor-made for the person re-
ceiving it, and as a result, the provider's skill, knowledge and
expertise come into play. ° Consequently, all that can be ex-
pected from these individuals is that they conduct themselves
as reasonable prudent persons. By holding the provider to
this standard, the only proper cause of action must, by neces-
sity, be negligence." Second, since the transaction is one-on-
one, there is little or no difficulty in locating the cause of an
injury.42 The injured plaintiff can usually identify not only the
provider but the substandard conduct as well.43 Therefore, a
cause of action based on negligence is the proper vehicle for
recovery. Third, individuals do not conduct themselves with
the same exactness and precision of machines.44 As a result,
persons are expected to perform services with reasonable care,
which implicates negligence.45  Finally, in a service transac-
39. See Shelhimer, supra note 36, at 793 (face-to-face relationship between service
provider and consumer); Sales, supra note 15, at 18 (service provider deals face-to-face
with consumer). In a service transaction, there is no distributive chain for spreading the
risk of injury, and risk distribution represents one of the fundamental underpinnings for
imposing strict liability against sellers. Id. at 19. See also Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901;
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 201 N.E.2d 313, 317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 210 N.E.2d
182 (Ill. 1965).
40. See Sales, supra note 15, at 25 (consumer bargains for skill, knowledge, and
experience of service provider); Shelhimer, supra note 36, at 793 (consumer expects
resona~l~e care, skill, and expertise from service provider).
41. See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (Cal. 1954) (en banc) (stating that
experts are not infallible, therefore, one can only expect reasonable care and compe-
tence, not insurance); Hodges v. Carter, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (N.C. 1954) (determining
that attorney should exercise best judgment); Burns v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth.,
344 S.E.2d 839, 846 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding health care provider to reasonable
standard of care). This rule of reasonableness with respect to professional services has
been consistently followed. See Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assoc., Eng'r,
102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (listing numerous cases where courts held
professionals to reasonableness standard); see generally Sales, supra note 15, at 18 (es-
sence of service provider transaction is performance of service with reasonable care);
John W. Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755, 760
(1959) (supporting proposition that attorney is liable only for negligence).
42. The same is not true in the case of a defective product. See La Rossa v. Scien-
tific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968); Wright v. Creative Corp., 498 P.2d
1179, 1183 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
43. See Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 539 P.2d 584, 588 (Idaho 1975).
44. See Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1969). The court stated
that a doctor's "performance is not mechanical or routine because each patient requires
individual study and formulation of an informed judgment as to the physical or mental
disability or condition presented, and the course of treatment needed." Id. at 703.
45. See supra note 41.
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tion, the focus is placed on the conduct of the individual,46 not
on the condition of any product. It follows, therefore, that the
proper cause of action should be negligence.47
Based on these considerations, it is apparent that strict
liability as offered by Section 402A should not be considered
in pure service transactions. For this reason, it is necessary to
analyze the hybrid bargain. Is it one where a product has
been introduced to the market place and as a result any injury
may be compensated under the three generally accepted theo-
ries of recovery: negligence,48 strict liability, 49 or warranty?50
Or is it a pure service transaction where generally the plain-
46. See Bennett v. Span Indus., 628 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
47. See Sales, supra note 15, at 18 (stating that negligence is appropriate remedy
for injury caused by defective service); Shelhimer, supra note 36, at 788 (arguing that
pure service transactions are better remedied by negligence).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965), provides that: "In the Re-
statement of this Subject, negligence is conduct which falls below the standard estab-
lished by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. It does not
include conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others."
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and ',.
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
50. UNIF. COMM. CODE § 2-313, IA U.L.A. 101 (1989):
Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample.
(1) Express Warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirma-
tion or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to
the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the
seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a
specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of
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tiff's only vehicle for relief is actionable negligence?"'
I1. THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR TEST
In the area of tort,52 when deciding whether a bargain is
for the sale of goods or the rendering of a service, the courts
have traditionally applied the predominant factor test.53 This
the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or com-
mendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
UNIF. COMM. CODE § 2-314, IA U.L.A. 212 (1989):
Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade.
(1) Unless excluded or modified .... a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variation permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
() conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified.., other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
UNIF. COMM. CODE § 2-315, IA U.L.A. 380 (1989):
Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose.
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any partic-
ular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified ... an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
51. The essential elements of actionable negligence are: (1) the existence of a duty
on the part of one party to another; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) an injury to the
person to whom that duty is owed as a proximate result of the breach. Sedar v. Knowl-
ton Constr. Co., 551 N.E.2d 938, 943 (Ohio 1990); Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw,
594 S.W.2d 519, 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776,
779 (Wyo. 1990).
52. See Sicard v. Kremer, 13 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Ohio St. 1938) (holding that tort
may be created from contractual breach and still be independent from that breach).
53. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that essence
of contract, whether for service or sale of goods, is determined by predominate factor
for entering contract); Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr., 225 Cal. Rptr. 595, 597
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (ruling that essence of transaction determines when strict liability
attaches); Trujillo v. Berry, 738 P.2d 1331, 1334 (N.M. Ct. App.) (holding strict liabil-
ity applicable because product predominated over service), cert. denied sub nom. H & P
Equip. Co. v. Berry, 738 P.2d 518 (N.M. 1987); see also Cantu, supra note 14, at 214
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test, which is generally a question of fact for the jury,54 delves
into the true essence or thrust of the hybrid bargain. 5 Nor-
mally, if the defendant's skill,56 knowledge," and/or expertise
influence the plaintiff's decision to enter into the agreement,
the transaction is likely for the rendition of a service.5 1 If,
however, such experience59 or training6° is not controlling and
the plaintiff enters into the agreement because of the product,
the bargain is considered a sale. 61 This emphasis on skill and
expertise, however, does not imply that only professionals are
capable of rendering services. The test applies to any situation
where the person's experience or skill comes into play.62 Re-
gardless of how menial,6 a if the person's proficiency induced
the plaintiff to enter into the bargain, the agreement will be
deemed as one for services.
Oddly enough, the predominant factor test predated Sec-
tion 402A.61 In fact, under the Uniform Sales Act,65 which
(arguing that courts have devised predominate factor test to determine main thrust of
transaction).
54. Stillwell v. Cincinnati Inc., 336 N.W.2d 618, 618 (N.D. 1983) (stating that
whether manufacturer is within scope of strict liability is factual question).
55. See supra note 53.
56. La Jolla Village Homeowners' Ass'n v. Superior Court, 261 Cal. Rptr. 146,
156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 532 A.2d 1081, 1086 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
57. See Dove v. Ruff, 558 N.E.2d 836, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
58. La Jolla, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 149; Roberts, 532 A.2d at 1086.
59. See Dove, 558 N.E.2d at 839; Air Heaters v. Johnson Elec., 258 N.W.2d 649,
654 (N.D. 1977).
60. See Bittler v. White and Co., 560 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
61. See id. at 982.
62. See Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Systems, 455 N.E.2d 142, 150 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1983) (concluding that contracts encompassing erection of building were for ser-
vice); McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn.
1987) (finding that restoration of creamery's artesian well was service).
63. See Grossman v. Aerial Farm Serv., 384 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (aerial application of herbicide); Boyle v. King County, 282 P.2d 261, 264 (Wash.
1955) (garbage collection contract).
64. See Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (N.Y. 1954) (finding
contract's predominant factor to be rendering of service). In addition, English courts
began distinguishing sales from service contracts to determine whether the Statute of
Frauds applied. Clay v. Yates, 156 Eng. Rep. 1123 (Ex. 1856) (holding that printing
contract was for services because materials were incidental to labor); William R. Rus-
sell, Note, Products and the Professional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid
Transaction, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 111, 113-16 (1972).
65. The Uniform Sales Act was drafted in 1906 and contained provisions for both
express and implied warranties. UNIF. SALES ACr §§ 12-16, 1 U.L.A. 173 (1950).
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preceded the U.C.C., 66 many courts were forced to distinguish
sales and services.67 The obvious reason was the applicability
of implied warranties, which arose in sales agreements but not
in services. 68 During that time, the leading cases espoused the
idea of the predominant factor of the transaction 69 to deter-
mine the type of bargain that was involved. If an injured
plaintiff wished to rely upon the theories furnished by the
Sales Act, it was crucial for that person to prove that a prod-
uct was purchased, and not a service.70 Warranties, 7' and par-
ticularly implied warranties,72 arose only when goods rather
than services entered the stream of commerce. Thus, it was
66. In 1952, the U.C.C. was adopted by the commissioners on uniform state laws.
UNIF. COMM. CODE, 1 U.L.A. iii (1989).
67. See Napoli v. St. Peter's Hosp. of Brooklyn, 213 N.Y.S.2d 6, 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1961) (ruling that blood products supplied by hospital were secondary to services for
restoring health); Krom v. Sharp & Dohme, Inc., 180 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1958) (finding transaction not sale because hospital services predominated over
incidental personalty transfer); Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat of Kennewick, 374 P.2d
549, 551 (Wash. 1962) (applying warranty provisions of Sales Act because purchase of
propane from dealer considered sale); Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 296 P.2d
662 (Wash. 1956) (holding patient's contract with hospital was for services and
indivisible).
68. UNIF. SALES AcT § 15, 1 U.L.A. 215 (1950). The pertinent portion referring
to the implied warranties of a sale reads:
§ 15. Implied warranties of quality.
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf, there is
no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular
purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears
that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not) there is an implied warranty that the goods
shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in
goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not)
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied warranty as
regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed.
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article under its
patent or other trade name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for
any particular purpose.
69. See generally Rowe v. Oscar Ewing Distrib. Co., 357 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Ky.
1962) (lending defective glass bottle was incidental service to milk sale); Betehia v. Cape
Cod Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Wis. 1960) (finding both food preparation and service in
restaurant are incidental to dominant purpose of sale).
70. See Krom, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 101; Kasey, 374 P.2d at 551.
71. See supra note 65.
72. See supra note 68.
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likewise necessary to define the nature of the transaction
under the U.C.C. as well as the Restatement. 3
For example, the comments to Section 402A state, in part
that:
[t]he rule stated in this Section applies to any person en-
gaged in the business of selling products for use or
consumption....
... The basis for the rule is the ancient one of the
special responsibility for the safety of the public under-
taken by one who enters into the business of supplying
human beings with products which may endanger the
safety of their persons and property, and the forced reli-
ance upon that undertaking on the part of those who
purchase such goods. 4
In short, the provisions of Section 402A 75 were to apply only
to the sale of goods. In adhering to that position, the courts
dealt with hybrid transactions by applying the predominant
factor test in tort cases in much the same way they had in
contract cases. 6 What was not foreseen at the time Section
402A came into existence, 77 however, was that the courts, ea-
ger to adopt this new tort,78 would arrive at some very unu-
73. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974); Silverhart v. Mount
Zion Hosp., 98 Cal. Rptr. 187, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (medical services); Rifle v.
Black, 548 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (installation of swimming pool); Worrell v.
Barnes, 484 P.2d 573, 573 (Nev. 1971) (contractor supplied defective gas fitting); Tru-
jillo v. Berry, 738 P.2d 1331, 1334 (N.M. Ct. App.) (car wash supplier), cert. denied sub
nom. H & P Equip. Co. v. Berry, 738 P.2d 518 (N.M. 1987).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965) (emphasis added).
75. Supra note 49.
76. See, e.g., Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir.
1981) (concluding that predominant factor of transaction was for service and repair of
truck); Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr., 225 Cal. Rptr. 595, 597 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (citing Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971))
(explaining that essence of relationship while hospital installs pacemaker is professional
service).
77. See Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964). The Fifth
Circuit, fully aware that the final version of § 402A was moving toward adoption, con-
cluded that since 1958 practically every court that had considered applying strict liabil-
ity had taken positions indicating a favorable response to the new section as it was
ultimately written. Id. at 919.
78. See, e.g., State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966)
(concluding § 402A states appropriate standards of responsibility for manufacturer of a
product), cert. denied sub nom. Yates v. Hodges, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Ford Motor Co.
v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966) (declaring approval and quoting § 402A provi-
sions); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789-90 (Tex. 1967) (adopting
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sual decisions.
IV. UNUSUAL DECISIONS RESULTING UNDER
SECTION 402A OF THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS
From the beginning, it was conceded that Section 402A
was weighted in favor of the plaintiff.79  It was primarily
adopted so that an individual who was injured by a defective
product would find it easier to recover under the theory of
strict liability rather than the traditional negligence action. 0
Under the Restatement," once a plaintiff overcame the hurdle
of establishing a defect, recovery was almost certain8 2
Viewed from a different perspective, under Section 402A it
was no longer a defense for a defendant to prove that he or she
did all that a reasonable prudent person8 3 could or would have
done under similar circumstances.8 4 The emphasis that was
once placed on the conduct of the defendant shifted, so that
§ 402A as the expression of strict tort liability), rev'g 408 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967).
79. Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
According to the court, one of the main policy grounds for applying strict liability to
electricity is to provide a "short-cut to liability where negligence may be present but is
difficult to prove." Id The court further stated:
Proof of negligence in cases such as this requires a plaintiff to present to a jury
evidence of the inner workings of an electrical power system of vast and com-
plex proportions. The technical operation of such systems and of electricity
itself is far beyond the knowledge of the average juror. The expert witnesses
who can explain such systems to the jury are concentrated within the industry
itself and may be reluctant to serve as expert witnesses in plaintiff's cases.
Id.
80. Id.
81. The argument is founded on a literal reading of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965), which states, in part: "One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property .... "
82. See Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230
N.W.2d 794, 798 (Wis. 1975) (finding that unreasonably dangerous defective product is
requisite element to strict liability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g
(1965) (stating that among other elements, defective condition is defined as condition
not contemplated by user and is unreasonably dangerous to user).
83. See Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975).
84. Bennett v. Span Indus., 628 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child, the standard of
conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man
under like circumstances.").
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under Section 402A the courts began looking at the product.8 5
Therefore, in some cases, it soon became evident that to grant
relief under the Restatement, 86 the courts were going to have
to stretch its provisions. As a result, there was more of an
interest in adopting strict liability in tort rather than following
the content of Section 402A.87
This interest in adopting strict liability was particularly
popular in those situations in which it was necessary to define
the term product.88 But, in defining product, the courts were
not explicitly dealing with the question of whether the bargain
was for the rendering of a service or the sale of goods. Thus,
the cases discussed below were not hybrid transactions per se.
Nevertheless, there was a definite momentum 89 toward adopt-
ing Section 402A, and by necessity this required the courts to
determine that a product was in fact the subject of the agree-
ment between the parties. This particular maneuver caused
many unusual results.
This phenomenon is best illustrated in transactions in-
volving real estate. In layman's terms, land is the antithesis of
goods.90 Nonetheless, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. 91 had lit-
tle difficulty in determining that an agreement for the sale of a
85. See Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1974);
Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 281 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
86. See supra note 49 for full text of RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965).
87. See, e.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1964) (finding
strict liability for injury caused by demonstrator model of forklift); Cintrone v. Hertz
Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 777 (N.J. 1965) (applying rule to lease
agreements).
88. See Vincent v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 1978 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 8278
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that when parties contract to build and purchase home,
completed structure constitutes product within § 402A); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529
S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (noting that neither § 402A nor its comments
indicate that rule is inapplicable to merchants of used products). See generally Charles
E. Cantu, The Illusive Meaning of the Term "Product" Under Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 635 (1991).
89. See Kopet v. Klein, 148 N.W.2d 385, 390 (Minn. 1967) (ruling that sale and
installation of chattel constitutes sale of product); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189
So. 2d 113, 123 (Miss. 1966) (finding sale of product when home builder defectively
installed water heater), cert. denied sub nom. Yates v. Hodges, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
90. See Cantu, supra note 88, at 645.
91. 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965); see also Avner v. Longridge Estates, 77 Cal. Rptr.
633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (applying strict liability to house lots that subsided due to
defective subsurface conditions).
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house is in fact a transaction for the sale of a product. In
Schipper, the court reasoned that an individual buying a mass
produced home was no different from one buying an automo-
bile.92 Both the home and automobile were results of assem-
bly line techniques.93 The court also employed several policy
considerations in arriving at its conclusion. 94 What is impor-
tant, however, is the decision that a house is a product, and
if defective and unreasonably dangerous, that product man-
dates strict liability for injuries sustained.95 It must be men-
tioned, though, that Schipper does not represent a general
consensus.
96
In like manner, electricity has been deemed a product.9
The courts in these instances have been very creative in their
reasoning. One court concluded that not only is electricity
capable of being produced, stored, measured, and transported,
but it can likewise be sold by a definite and well understood
standard; therefore, it constitutes a good like any other com-
modity.98 In arriving at the same conclusion, another court
92. "Buyers of mass produced development homes are not on equal footing with
the builder vendors and are no more able to protect themselves in the deed than are
automobile purchasers in a position to protect themselves in the bill of sale." Schipper,
207 A.2d at 326.
93. Id. at 325.
94. The court specifically referred to the unequal bargaining positions of the par-
ties; the buyer's reliance upon the skill, knowledge, and expertise of the contractor; the
builder's ability to spread the cost of liability; and the corresponding inability of the
buyers to protect themselves from the risk of probable loss. Id. at 325-26.
95. Id at 329-30.
96. !Kg., McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co., 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1348 (D.
Colo. 1980); K-Mart Corp. v. Mideon Realty Group, 489 F. Supp. 813, 817 (D. Conn.
1980); Greene v. Green Acres Constr. Co., 543 P.2d 108, 110 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975);
Wright v. Creative Corp., 498 P.2d 1179, 1182-83 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Coburn v.
Lenox Homes, 378 A.2d 599, 602 (Conn. 1977); Lowrie v. City of Evanston, 365
N.E.2d 923, 928 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Cree Coaches, Inc. v. Panel Suppliers, 186
N.W.2d 335, 336 (Mich. 1971); Queensbury Union Free School Dist. v. Jim Walter
Corp., 442 N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), appeal dismissed, 431 N.E.2d 642
(N.Y. 1981); Van Ornum v. Otter Tail Power Co., 210 N.W.2d 188, 201 (N.D. 1973);
Cook v. Salishan Properties, 569 P.2d 1033, 1035-36 (Or. 1977) (en banc); Cox v. Shaf-
fer, 302 A.2d 456, 457 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).
97. See, e.g., Aversa v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 451 A.2d 976, 980 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1982) (arguing that where electricity is placed in stream of commerce, strict
liability principles apply); Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 501 A.2d 1128,
1133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (explaining that electricity is product for purposes of
§ 402A); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 648 (Wis. 1979)
(finding electricity is product for purpose of strict liability).
98. See State v. Interstate Power Co., 226 N.W. 427, 433 (Neb. 1929). In Inter-
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adopted the reasons for employing strict liability.99 Once
again, however, what is of concern is that each court arrived
at the unusual decision that electricity, which was defined as
"a force, like the wind,''1°° is a product. 10 1 This liberal ap-
proach has also been employed in fact situations concerning
water,10 2 component parts,1 1 3 and computer software." It
state Power Co., the court refused to recognize "raw products" and "manufactured
products" as mutually exclusive terms. Id. at 433. The defendants proposed that by
distinguishing the two terms, electricity in its "raw" form should not be deemed a prod-
uct. Id. The court, however, stated that a " '[p]roduct' is defined by authoritative lexi-
cographers as 'a thing produced by nature or the natural processes; that which is
produced by an action, operation or work; a production; the results; that which results
from operation of a cause, consequence, or effect.'' Id. The court continued by estab-
lishing electricity as a commodity.
[I]n the language of everyday life and in the strictly commercial sense of the
term, "electricity" is "produced," "stored," "measured," "bought and sold."
It is moved or transported from place to place in containers or by cable. It is
something that one trades or deals in. We buy it and pay for it and determine
the amount of our purchases by [a] definite and well-understood "standard."
Brought into being as a product, it exists in modern life as a commodity.
Id. Electricity has been defined as "a form of energy that can be made or produced by
men, confined, controlled, transmitted and distributed to be used as an energy source
for heat, power, and light and is distributed in the stream of commerce." Ransome, 275
N.W.2d at 643. See also Terrace Water Co. v. San Antonio Light & Power Co., 82 P.
562, 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1905) (illustrating that defendant contracted to sell energy in
which it had ownership as personal property); Seaton Mountain Elec. Light, Heat &
Power Co. v. Idaho Springs Inv. Co., 111 P. 834, 835 (Colo. 1910) (describing heating
agents such as water and steam as merchantable products).
99. Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
One of the main policy grounds for applying strict liability to electricity is "to provide a
'short-cut' to liability where negligence may be present but is difficult to prove .... Id.
at 291. The court also looked to three other strict liability policy considerations in
making its decision. First, defendants are in a much better position than plaintiffs to
detect and correct electrical, supply problems. Id. Second, defendants will have an in-
centive to avoid accidents by. creating safer products. Id. at 292. Finally, defendants
are able to spread the associated costs among millions of consumers. Idi
100. Id. at 288 n.3.
101. In Pierce, a home consumer of electricity was injured due to the mechanical
failure of a transformer that sent 7000 volts of electricity into her home. Id. at 285.
The court noted: "Electricity alone cannot perform work. Electricity alone is useless
from a consumer's point of view. Electricity is a stream of electrons that is created,
transmitted, distributed, and converted to energy all within milliseconds. No California
court has ever held that electricity is a product." Id. at 288 n.3. In this case, however,
the court held that a commercial supplier of electricity could be strictly liable for per-
sonal injures. Id at 291.
102. Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583, 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
103. Scott Gordon Night, Comment, Products Liability: Component Part Manufac-
turer's Liability for Design and Warning Defects, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 215, 226 (1988).
104. See Diane B. Lawrence, Strict Liability, Computer Software and Medicine:
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was also extended to a case involving an incorrect pilot's land-
ing chart, which can best be described as a "defective idea."' 10 5
On the other hand, innovative plaintiffs have tried, but
failed to apply the definition of product to erroneous credit
reports, I°6 a magazine article involving autoerotic asphyxia-
tion that allegedly caused a death, 1 0 7 a science experiment in a
text book which went awry, 08 recipes, 109 and lyrics of a song
that supposedly induced a teenager to commit suicide. 110
Oddly enough, blood has escaped the trend of becoming clas-
sified as a product.' This is primarily because the legisla-
tures in forty-nine states have enacted what can be collectively
designated as "blood shield" statutes, 1' 2 which expressly or
Public Policy at the Crossroads, 23 TORT & INS. LJ. 1, 9 (1987); see also Peter G.
Neuman, Risks to the Public in Computers and Related Systems, SOFTWARE ENGI-
NEERING NoTEs, July 1987, at 2; Ed Joyce, Software Bugs: A Matter of Life and Liabil-
ity, DATAMATION, May 15, 1987, at 88.
105. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir.
1981). But see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 585 F. Supp. 739,
745 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (implicating that products liability action for defective ideas within
manual may have been inappropriate). See also Andrew T. Bayman, Comment, Strict
Liability for Defective Ideas in Publications, 42 VAND. L. REV. 557 (1989).
106. L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (D. Conn.
1986); see also Bayman, supra note 105, at 569.
107. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983), modified
on other grounds, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), and cert denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
In Herceg, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death suit against Hustler magazine alleg-
ing that an article on autoerotic asphyxiation was an unreasonably dangerous and defec-
tive product that caused the deaths of the plaintiff's son and brother. The decedents
attempted to duplicate the sexual technique in the magazine, which was intended to
increase erotic pleasure during masturbation.
108. Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981), modified on
other grounds, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). In Walter, a child suffered
injuries after attempting to duplicate an experiment involving a ruler and rubber bands.
The court rejected the strict liability claim on the basis that the "plaintiff was not in-
jured by use of the book for the purpose for which it was designed, ie., to be read." Id.
at 822.
109. See Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (ruling that
cook book recipes were not subject to strict liability), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 674 (Fla.
1977).
110. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
111. See Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Colo. 1964)
(holding that blood transfusion is service); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial
Blood Bank, 132 N.W.2d 805, 810-11 (Minn. 1965) (interpreting statute as blood sup-
plier provides service and not product); see generally Roberts v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n,
532 A.2d 1081, 1086 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (stating that blood transfusion uses
defendant's skill to restore health, therefore, blood is not product).
112. See ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (1984) (providing blood is service); ALASKA
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impliedly provide that strict liability shall not apply to trans-
STAT. § 45.02.316(e) (1986) (hospital provides blood as service); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-1481(B) (1992) (nonprofit blood bank cannot be strictly liable); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-9-802 (Michie 1991) (blood provider liable only for negligence or wilful mis-
conduct); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1990) (blood transfusion is
service not sale); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-104(2) (1989) (blood transfusion
constitutes service); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West 1986) (providing blood
is service); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2-316(5) (1975) (blood transfusion is service); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 28:2-314 (1991) (against public policy to hold blood bank strictly liable);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(5) (West Supp. 1992) (blood transfusion is rendition of
medical service); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-2-316(5) (Michie 1982) (providing blood is med-
ical service); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-91 (Repl. 1985) (no implied warranty that blood
is pure where scientific test to detect disease is unavailable); IDAHO CODE § 39-3702
(Supp. 1992) (blood transfusion is service); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111/2 para. 5102 § 2
(Smith-Hurd 1988) (strict tort liability not applicable to blood providers); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-8-7-2(a) (Bums Supp. 1992) (procurement of blood is a service which does
not give rise to strict liability); IOWA CODE ANN. § 142A.8 (West 1989) (providing
blood is service); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (1985) (providing blood is rendition of
service and no liability absent negligence); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.125 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Repl. 1991) (processing and distribution of blood deemed service); LA.
CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2322.1 (West Supp. 1992) (strict liability not applicable to blood
providers); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-108 (West Supp. 1991) (providing blood is
service regardless of any remuneration); MD. C'I'S. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-373
(Supp. 1992) (supplier of blood performs service); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-
316(5) (Law. Co-op. 1984) (blood is a service and not subject to implied warranties);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.9121 (West 1992) (providing blood is service regard-
less of profit); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-315 (West 1966) (interpreted to mean blood
supplier provides service); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-314 (1981) (may be cited for hold-
ing that blood transfusion is service); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.069 (1992) (procurement
of blood is rendition of medical service); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-102 (1991) (fur-
nishing blood not sale of product); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4001 (1990) (procuring blood
is rendition of service); NEV. REV. STAT. § 460.010 (1991) (no liability for providing
blood other than negligence or willful misconduct); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-b
(1983) (no strict liability regarding blood products); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5
(Michie Repl. 1991) (no liability for blood processing other than negligence or willful
misconduct); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 580(4) (McKinney 1990) (procuring blood is
service); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-410 (1989) (blood transfusion is service); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 43-17-40 (Repl. 1978) (no liability for blood except negligence or willful
misconduct); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (Anderson Supp. 1991) (sale of blood
constitutes service); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 2151 (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 97.300 (Repl. 1990) (sale of blood not sales transaction); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit.
42, § 8333 (Purdon 1982) (no strict liability for blood transfusion); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 23-17-30 (1989) (no liability for blood transfusion other than negligence or willful
misconduct); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (sale of blood is medical
service); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-315.1 (1988) (sale of blood is medical
service); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (Repl. 1979) (implied warranties inapplicable
to sale of blood); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 77.003 (Vernon Supp. 1992)
(no liability for blood transfusion except for negligence, gross negligence or intentional
tort); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-31-1 (Repl. 1989) (sale of blood participant provides ser-
vice); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-108 (Supp. 1992) (procurement of blood is service);
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-297 (Repl. 1992) (no action for implied warranty in connection
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actions involving blood. New Jersey's legislature is the sole
dissenter in this area; however, it was judicially decided that
strict liability may not apply to blood transfusions." 3
Although the issue of a hybrid transaction was not pa-
tently presented by some of these cases, the decisions illustrate
how far some courts have gone in their zeal to apply strict
liability under Section 402A. If there had been a service issue,
the courts would have unquestionably applied the predomi-
nant factor test. The following discussion illustrates, however,
that it may be unnecessay to align a product against a service
when applying the provisions of the Restatement. An alterna-
tive method that is more direct and logical will permit the
courts to deal with fact situations of this kind.
V. THE GRAVAMEN TEST
Unlike the predominant factor test, which focuses on the
nature of the transaction, the gravamen test concentrates on
the cause of the injury. Application of this test is simple and
direct. More importantly, there is no need to stretch the
meaning of any particular term. The theory first arose in
1982,1 14 apparently in response to the Nevada Supreme
Court's decision in Worrell v. Barnes."5 The plaintiff hired
the defendant contractor to do carpentry work in his home
and to connect various appliances to an existing liquefied pe-
with transfer of blood or human tissue); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.120 (West
1992) (no implied warranty for blood service unless donor received compensation); W.
VA. CODE § 16-23-1 (Repl. 1991) (procurement of blood declared not to be sale); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 146.31 (West 1989) (blood transfer constitutes service and subject to lia-
bility only for negligence or willful misconduct); Wyo. STAT. § 34.1-2-316(c)(iv) (1991)
(dispensing blood constitutes medical service).
113. Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 317 A.2d 392, 394 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974),
aff'd, 332 A.2d 596 (N.J. 1975). The reluctance by the legislature to enact a New
Jersey blood shield statute may be due, in part, to the courts' willingness to apply strict
liability to pure service transactions. See, e.g., Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem.
Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 186-87 (N.J. 1982) (imposing strict liability on service providers);
Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1969), aff'g 247 A.2d 886 (N.J.
1968), where the court held:
One, who in the regular course of a business sells or applies a product (in the
sense of the sales-service hybrid transaction involved in the present case)
which is in such a dangerously defective condition as to cause physical harm
to the consumer-patron, is liable for the harm.
114. 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 21, § 2-102:04, at 12.
115. 484 P.2d 573 (Nev. 1971).
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troleum gas system.1 1 6 The plaintiff subsequently sued for
damages that resulted from a fire caused by a defective fitting
that was installed by the contractor. The causes of action
were based on both strict liability under the Restatement and
implied warranty as contained in the U.C.C.1 1 7 Although the
lower court dismissed the claim, the supreme court reversed
that decision because there was a finding that the contractor
had sold a product, therefore, allowing the plaintiff to invoke
strict liability." 8 Additionally, the court determined that the
case involved goods that were subject to implied warranties.' 9
As a consequence of the Worrell decision, Chancellor
William D. Hawkland suggested an idea that has since be-
come known as the gravamen test. In his most quoted seg-
ment, he wrote:
Unless uniformity would be impaired thereby, it
might be more sensible and facilitate administration, at
least in [the hybrid transaction], to abandon the "predom-
inant factor" test and focus instead on whether the grava-
men of the action involves goods or services. For
example, in Worrell v. Barnes, if the gas escaped because
of a defective fitting or connector, the case might be char-
acterized as one involving the sale of goods. On the other
hand, if the gas escaped because of poor work by [the con-
tractor] the case might be characterized as one involving
services, outside the scope of the U.C.C. 2 °
Since then, the test has been adopted by a respectable number
of courts in sales/service fact situations that involved the
U.C.C. 2 ' These courts have for the most part abandoned the
predominant factor test, which was applied to this issue long
before the U.C.C. existed.12  The most obvious advantage to
116. Id at 574.
117. Id. at 576.
118. Id. at 575.
119. Id.
120. 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 21,'§ 2-102:04, at 12.
121. E.g., Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984); Anthony
Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (Md. 1983); see also In re Trailer and Plumbing
Supplies, 578 A.2d 343, 345 (N.H. 1990) (dictum) (stating that case must allege either
defective product or service to require gravamen analysis).
122. See Anthony Pools, 455 A.2d at 439-41 (expressing that if predominant factor
test were applied, there would be no implied warranties for defective diving boards); In
re Trailer, 578 A.2d at 345 (ruling that gravamen test, rather than predominant factor
test, applies to future cases alleging defective product or service).
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injured plaintiffs under this new idea is that even though the
transaction is predominantly for the rendering of consumer
services, the warranty provisions of the U.C.C. continue to
apply to any product involved in the agreement. 123 By focus-
ing on the cause of the injury rather than the nature of the
transaction, the courts are able to afford an injured plaintiff
remedies that would otherwise be lost. These courts have
moved away from what has been described as the mechanical
approach 124 of the predominant factor test, and as a result
have reached more equitable and logical decisions.
Although the gravamen test arose in cases where the the-
ory was contractual, its rational approach is likewise applica-
ble in the area of tort. Under U.C.C. provisions, the issue is
whether or not a product is present so as to permit a cause of
action based on a warranty. Under the Restatement, the issue
is the same, but only because we seek to apply the theory of
strict liability. It is not difficult to see that in hybrid transac-
tions the problem of the applicable theory is more easily
solved under the gravamen test as opposed to the predominant
factor test. For example, although an agreement is for the fit-
ting of contact lenses,1 25 the question under the gravamen test
no longer depends upon the skill or expertise of the defendant
or the reason the plaintiff entered into the transaction. In-
stead, the court focuses on the cause of the injury. If the
plaintiff receives an injury as a result of defective lenses, the
appropriate causes of action may now be strict liability under
Section 402A, breach of warranty under the U.C.C., and/or
the common law theory of actionable negligence. If, on the
other hand, the injury results from unreasonable conduct
while the lenses are being fitted, the plaintiff may pursue only
a claim for actionable negligence. The same logic should be
followed in any agreement involving the sale of a product with
123. Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1117 (Md. 1989); Anthony
Pools, 455 A.2d at 441.
124. GEORGE I. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE, $ 11.05[3], at 11-28 (1981), states that: "If the service aspect
predominated, no warranties of quality were imposed in the transaction, not even if the
defect or complaint related to the goods that were involved rather than to the services.
This mechanical approach remains the most popular method of resolving the issue."
125. See supra note 24.
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an attending service."'
In addition to simplifying the approach to hybrid trans-
actions, the gravamen test will prevent an illogical extension
of some terms in Section 402A. It will no longer be necessary,
for example, to include houses,127 electricity,128 water,129 com-
ponent parts,130 computer software,
131 or defective ideas 132
under the designation of product. Moreover, injured plaintiffs
will not be led to mischaracterize other similar subject mat-
ter. "3 Instead, by focusing on the cause of the injury and not
the nature of the transaction, the injured plaintiffs will be enti-
tled to the remedies available under strict liability in any situa-
tion where the injury was caused by the defendant placing a
defective product into the stream of commerce. 134 In so do-
ing, the true intent of Section 402A will be given effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
When confronted with a hybrid transaction, a court has
several tests that determine whether an individual is entitled
to the relief provided by the U.C.C. as well as the Restate-
ment. Some have delineated the nature of the bargain based
on the distinction of a commercial versus a professional ba-
sis, 13 the "English Rule,"' 36 a principle of policy, or some
126. See cases cited supra notes 25-35 for other examples of hybrid transactions. In
the absence of the legislatively enacted blood shield laws, supra note 112 and accompa-
nying text, the same would be true in cases involving blood transfusions.
127. See supra note 91.
128. See supra note 97.
129. See supra note 102.
130. See supra note 103.
131. See supra note 104.
132. See supra note 105.
133. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
134. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976).
135. [Tlhere has been judicial willingness to abandon the sale-service distinc-
tion in determining whether to impose liability without fault. This has been
true, however, only when the relationship between plaintiff and defendant
arises from a commercial transaction, such as a restaurant's service of spoiled
food or a beautician's application of a defective wave solution. On the other
hand, when a defective product is supplied in conjunction with a professional
service, such as dentistry or medicine, the distinction between sales and serv-
ices continues.
Russell, supra note 64, at 112 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
136. In England, the Statute of Frauds' writing requirement was applicable for
"sale of goods" contracts, but was inapplicable for "performance of services" contracts;
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other norm. However, the basis that has become the most
.widely used, and the one which appears to incorporate all of
the elements under one heading, is the predominant factor
test. a'3  This standard was first used under the Uniform Sales
Act and subsequently incorporated into cases arising under
the U.C.C. and Section 402A. It concentrates on the nature
of the transaction and by so doing determines whether an in-
jured plaintiff is entitled to the remedies of warranty and/or
strict liability.
In contrast, the gravamen test, which is relatively new,
virtually ignores the nature of the agreement and instead fo-
cuses on the cause of the plaintiff's injury. This test is not
only more direct and logical, but it also achieves more equita-
ble results. There is no need to stretch terms beyond their
traditional meanings, and even in those transactions that are
primarily service-oriented, an individual may still recover
under the warranty provisions of the U.C.C. If the product is
proven to be defective, the remedy of strict liability under the
Restatement should be utilized as well. Up to now, this test
has been employed exclusively in the area of contract, but as
shown, it would operate equally as well in the sphere of tort.
Because there is no apparent reason for rejecting the grava-
men test, it should be adopted as the determinative test in the
hybrid sales/service transaction under Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
therefore, the English Rule was adopted to distinguish sales from services. See Lee v.
Griffin, 121 Eng. Rep. 716 (K.B. 1861). The English Rule was based on determining
whether work and labor produced tangible goods which were the basis of a sale; if so,
the "sale of goods" contract was required to be in writing. Id. at 718.
137. Based on equity and public policy, courts use a "policy" test on an ad hoc basis
to examine the particular case facts and determine if the U.C.C. principles apply. Crys-
tal L. Miller, Note, The Goods/Services Dichotomy and the U.C.C.: Unweaving the Tan-
gled Web, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 717, 718 (1984).
138. See supra note 53.

